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SOCIAL EVOLUTION FORUM 
Three Wishes for the World 
Harvey Whitehouse 
University of Oxford 
 
If you had three wishes to change the world, what would they be? 
Perhaps you would like to put an end to war? Reverse global 
warming? Or eliminate extreme poverty?   
Introduction 
The key to solving all these problems is glue. It doesn’t come in a tube. It’s a 
very special adhesive – the kind that holds societies together. Social scientists 
call it ‘social cohesion’ or ‘solidarity’. Whatever we choose to call it, social glue 
is what makes people cooperate and solve problems for the greater good. 
 Understanding how groups become glued together is crucial to addressing 
some of the biggest issues facing humanity today. 
 If I had three wishes for the world, they would be: 
 1. To predict, prevent, and resolve civil wars. We know that about half of all 
insurgencies peter out within a year of their formation. Those that survive 
seem to have found the knack for producing the social glue we are interested 
in. Attacking such groups with bullets and bombs actually seems to bind them 
even more tightly together. If you want to disband groups like this it would be 
more effective to sabotage the mechanisms that fuse them to a common cause. 
The more we understand these mechanisms the more we can do to curtail 
sectarian violence, genocide, and many other forms of civil conflict. 
 2. To channel social cohesion for the collective good. Civil strife can 
produce social glue. We had a researcher on the ground in Libya throughout 
the recent revolution observing how the collective will of ordinary 
citizens brought a modern army to its knees (albeit with some help from 
NATO). We now know more about the mechanisms that made this possible. If 
only that energy could have been harnessed more productively in the 
aftermath of Gaddafi’s downfall, then Libya might be a very different place 
today. 
 3. To mobilize a global response to economic inequality and environmental 
threat. Many social movements in the twentieth century experimented with 
rituals aimed at binding us together as a species to solve world problems. 
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Those experiments have largely failed – visions of a communist utopia or a 
brotherhood of man have been shattered by old divisions or faded in time. But 
that doesn’t mean they couldn’t work. We are currently studying movements of 
this kind on the Pacific island archipelago of Vanuatu. Imagine if we could find 
a new and more effective way of gluing together our species as a whole, 
championing a set of shared values and goals underwritten by a universal 
morality rather than a doctrinal orthodoxy of any kind. That would be the first 
crucial step in solving some of the world’s biggest collective action problems – 
global warming and extreme poverty being only two examples. 
 Pie in the sky? Some of us don’t think so. I direct a project that tries to 
explain how social glue is produced and how it can be used (Whitehouse 2012; 
Jones 2013). It is the single largest project ever funded by the UK’s Economic 
and Social Research Council and it is also the most international one ever, 
involving the coordinated efforts of scientists not only in North America and 
Europe, but also around the world, including many countries that are not often 
associated with scientific breakthroughs. It has to be that way, because the glue 
we are interested in is often stronger in traditional or rural cultures and 
weaker in the big urban centres where scientists typically work. 
Two Kinds of Social Glue 
There are two main kinds of social glue: ‘social identification’ and ‘identity 
fusion’. The latter is most simply described as a visceral sense of oneness with 
others in one’s group. This may be manifested in a variety of ways. For 
instance, when another group member is threatened it prompts the same 
defensive reactions as a personal attack. For the fused individual, the boundary 
between the personal and social self is porous – activation of one’s sense of 
personal self also serves to activate feelings about the social self. Fused 
individuals regard other members of their group as irreplaceable, and seek to 
reform and reintegrate them when they violate their group’s norms rather than 
kicking them out for good. When the group is under attack, or their status 
threatened, fusion increases commitment to maintain the group. 
 Identity fusion is a widespread feature of kin groups and other small social 
units whose members share the trials and tribulations of life together. This 
sharing of experiences as well as the memories of those experiences, 
particularly of enduring and overcoming hardships, seems to be an important 
part of the mechanism generating fusion, most commonly within families but 
sometimes also within much larger groups. 
 My mother remembers how tightly glued together our family was 
throughout the war. During the Blitz they spent a lot of time huddled together 
in bomb shelters. One night, however, my mother’s uncle and aunt and their 
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young son emerged before the All Clear had been sounded, and went inside. 
The last bomb of the air raid fell on their house and they were killed instantly. 
 An evacuee at the time, my mother only heard about the tragedy months 
later. She was on the top deck of a bus. She remembers it being a glorious day, 
the pretty summer dress she was wearing, that it was a treat to get the seat at 
the front. Her mother turned to her and said: “Your uncle and auntie’s house 
was bombed and they were inside it. Your cousin too.” That was all. It would 
have been improper to display emotion in public, so where better to deliver the 
news than on a crowded London bus? My mother was nine years old at the 
time. 
 It is very unlikely my mother would have remembered the weather or what 
she was wearing or even where she was sitting that day on the bus, were it not 
for the emotional impact of my grandmother’s words. Integral to our sense of 
self is a set of memories of past experiences, including episodes that are felt to 
be especially salient in forming who we are. Such episodes will often relate to 
painful or disturbing experiences because these are generally better 
remembered than pleasant or gratifying ones. 
 While these ‘bad’ experiences come to form part of our personal 
autobiographies that does not necessarily mean they are rehearsed as 
narratives. Often, there are social disincentives to talk about such experiences 
— because they conflict with idealized conceptions of family life, gender roles, 
Britishness, or whatever. But that doesn’t mean the memories are lost. They 
remain as part of our private sense of self. Indeed this sense of privacy, of 
experience that is internally generated rather than externally imposed, adds to 
the authenticity of these aspects of our self-conception. 
 The impression that highly salient personal experiences are shared by 
others fuels the fusion of self and other. It is as if those who have been through 
the same thing are more ‘like us’ and the boundary between self and other 
becomes more porous. This would help to explain why people who endure 
terrible ordeals, such as natural disasters or wars, or who have experienced 
persecution or oppression, often feel a special bond with their fellow sufferers. 
My mother, for example, felt a special connection with children who turned up 
at school with black armbands. And conversely, it can feel as if people who 
haven’t actually experienced your pain themselves cannot truly understand it, 
and may seem inauthentic if they talk about the subject with an air of 
authority. 
 In all these respects, identity fusion differs from what psychologists call 
‘social identification’ (Swann et al. 2012). Social identity theorists have 
repeatedly shown that personal and group identities are non-overlapping. 
Social identity and group identity have a sort of hydraulic relationship to each 
other: the more one is activated, the less the other is. If your group identity 
prevails in your social life, the less prominently social identity will feature. 
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Attacks on the group activate social but not personal selves in people who 
identify with, but are not fused with, the group. Pro-group action is not 
motivated by the personal self. Members of the group are replaceable and 
norm violators can be more readily excluded from the group. When the status 
of the group is threatened, identification with the group is weakened. 
Shared Dysphoria, Fusion, and Extreme Rituals 
In 2011, project researcher Brian McQuinn went to Misrata, Libya, to study 
people’s experiences of the siege of their city by Gaddafi’s troops. Amid the 
victory celebrations, I joined him there. In collaboration with Bill Swann, a 
social psychologist based at the University of Texas at Austin, we designed and 
implemented a survey revealing that the more dysphoric (aversive or 
distressing) the shared experience of the fighting, the stronger the resulting 
identity fusion. To understand the mechanisms in more detail we are currently 
carrying out surveys with veterans of the Vietnam War, members of university 
fraternities and sororities who have undergone painful or humiliating hazing 
rituals, mothers who had particularly traumatic birthing experiences, survivors 
of disasters, and other groups that are formed around shared experiences of 
suffering. 
 Dysphoric rituals (such as painful initiations, ascetic ordeals, or severe 
forms of penance) are a bit like coming under fire in a warzone, but perhaps 
more powerfully bonding. By definition they are ‘causally opaque‘ meaning 
that they can be interpreted in a seemingly infinite variety of ways: it’s not 
clear how the actions one performs lead, through a causal chain of events, to 
any outcomes, so there’s a lot of room for speculation and rumination. Unlike a 
car crash or even a traumatic experience on the battlefield, which provokes a 
rather limited array of reflections (who was to blame, why me, etc), the range 
of interpretations that one can place on a dysphoric ritual experience is more 
open-ended. Indeed, the sense of its significance can actually increase over 
time, rather than decay. In communal rituals we observe others undergoing 
the same experience, and can imagine them sharing the same rich interpretive 
process afterwards. The forces shaping one’s own uniquely personal 
experiences are felt to be shared by a special cohort of others, causing group 
members who have undergone these rituals to ‘fuse’. 
 That’s one of our hypotheses, at least. In a series of experiments using 
artificial rituals and varying levels of arousal (intensity of feeling) we have 
shown that, after a time delay, the volume and specificity of interpretive 
reflection on the rituals is greater among participants in a high-arousal 
condition than for controls (Richert et al. 2005). Similar effects have been 
found using field studies, by systematically comparing the interpretive richness 
of people’s accounts of rituals involving variable levels of arousal. The 
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impression of sharing subtle or hidden meanings of the ritual experience is 
thought to contribute to high levels of identity fusion among participants. We 
call this the ‘imagistic mode’ of group cohesion (Whitehouse 2004). 
Shared Identity in the Big Religions 
Although the sharing of especially salient and memorable experiences seems to 
play an important role in identity fusion, this does not seem to be such an 
important feature of social identification and the categorical ties on which this 
is based. Social identification is more like a badge or a uniform that we can put 
on and take off at will. Whereas the building blocks of the personal self are 
internally generated states (e.g. emotions, memories, and reflections), social 
identities are acquired from the world around us. The sense of likeness this 
produces can be compelling but it doesn’t penetrate our sense of self to the 
same extent or in the same way. 
 When people participate in the same rituals on a daily or weekly basis, it is 
impossible for them to recall the details of every occasion. Instead they 
represent the rituals and their meanings as types of behavior—a Holy 
Communion or a call to prayer, for instance. Psychologists describe these 
representations as ‘procedural scripts’ and ‘semantic schemas’. Scripts and 
schemas specify what typically happens in a given ritual and what is generally 
thought to be its significance. In a group whose identity markers are composed 
mainly of scripts and schemas, what it means to be a member of the tradition 
is generalized beyond people of our acquaintance, applying to everyone who 
performs similar acts and holds similar beliefs. This route to the construction 
of communal identity, based on routinization of rituals and other behaviours, 
appears to be a necessary condition for the emergence of imagined 
communities — large populations sharing a common tradition and capable of 
behaving as a coalition in interactions with non-members, despite the fact that 
no individual in the community could possibly know all the others, or even 
hope to meet all of them in the course of a lifetime. 
 Routinization may have other important effects as well. For instance, it 
allows very complex networks of doctrines and narratives to be learned and 
stored in collective memory, making it relatively easy to spot unauthorized 
innovations. Moreover, routinization seems to suppress reflection, in effect 
producing more slavish conformity to group norms. Part of the reason may be 
that, having achieved procedural fluency, one no longer needs to reflect on 
how to perform the ritual, and this in turn makes one less likely to reflect on 
why one should perform it. Thus routinization would seem to aid the 
transmission of doctrinal orthodoxies, which are traditions of belief and 
practice that are relatively immune to innovation and in which unintended 
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deviation from the norm is readily detectable. We call this the ‘doctrinal mode’ 
of group cohesion (Whitehouse 2004). 
Local and Extended Fusion 
So far, both in our experiments and in our studies of dysphoric rituals in the 
real world, we have focused our attention mainly on rituals in small face-to-
face groups. This ‘local fusion’ may have its evolutionary roots in psychological 
kinship, where shared experience acted as a proxy for genetic relatedness. Our 
central hypothesis is that the belief that someone else shares and so truly 
understands your suffering blurs the boundary between yourself and that other 
person. But while this can be true among people who witness each other’s 
trials and tribulations it can also be extended by less direct routes, for example 
by means of especially compelling narratives. To the extent that Jesus of 
Nazareth’s sufferings on the cross can be convincingly equated with our own 
sufferings it may even be possible to fuse with a person who lived thousands of 
years ago. 
 Fusion can also be extended to larger groups and ideologies — and not 
always in ways we would want. Consider the highly ritualized and emotional 
gatherings organized at Nuremberg by Hitler and his cronies. During these 
dark days ordinary Germans were swept up in a tide of nationalistic fervor 
rooted in shared ritual experiences. Nevertheless, Hitler’s rallies were too big 
for all those attending to have known each other personally. There was also a 
strong doctrinal aspect that is normally lacking in dysphoric rituals: Hitler was 
preaching an ideology that, however repugnant to us now, was hypnotically 
seductive to his audiences. Apparently, people were fusing with a belief system 
as well as with each other. 
 Extended fusion of this kind is likely to be different from local fusion. In the 
case of Nazis at the Nuremberg rallies, they couldn’t encode all the other 
people attending and so couldn’t recognize all of them subsequently. 
Somebody might claim to have been present and there might be evidence to 
support it but I don’t think this could ever be as psychologically convincing as 
actually remembering them being there. Moreover, at least some of the ideas 
associated with this kind of experience have an external origin and so are less 
intimately connected with the personal self. Recall that one of the hypothesized 
features of local fusion is that personal experience, on which my sense of self is 
at least partly constructed, provides the main reference point for sharing a 
common bond. So extended fusion would seem to be a more tentative kind of 
fusion of self and other. Since it depends on external sources as well as direct 
personal engagement (e.g. testimony rather than experience) it carries less 
conviction. 
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 You might think that extended fusion is somehow a midway point between 
local fusion with known individuals and identification with large anonymous 
communities. But this doesn’t seem to be the case – fusion with country, for 
example, has all the same hallmark features as fusion with family, making both 
kinds of fusion distinct from identification (Swann et el. 2012). 
The Social Functions of Ritual, Fusion, and 
Identification 
Identity fusion could be seen as a form of insurance through investment in 
social networks based on relational ties. When the fate of the group is 
threatened or uncertain, fused individuals experience increased commitment. 
And when a transgressor is identified in the group they might be punished 
harshly but they are nevertheless welcomed back into the fold. This kind of 
investment in the group is not provided by identification with groups based on 
categorical ties. Although there may be some exceptions, when people merely 
identify with a group and its status declines, so does commitment to the group. 
And since the members of such groups are eminently replaceable, 
transgressors can be eliminated (e.g. by exclusion or execution). This means 
that the members of fused groups can rely on the group for support even when 
times are hard or when one’s reputation has been damaged. 
 Identity fusion fosters courage and self-sacrifice in the face of external 
threats in a way that social identification cannot. When the group is at risk of 
predation, members not only band together but individually experience a sense 
of enhanced strength, invulnerability, and increased willingness to endorse 
acts of outgroup hostility. This means that members of fused groups will be 
more formidable adversaries in inter-group conflict, all else being equal. 
 Prior to the emergence of the doctrinal mode in human prehistory, group 
identity was forged largely on the basis of directly shared experiences, 
including participation in rituals. Thus, the imagistic mode has long been a 
means of generating the impression of shared mental content based on 
common experience. With the appearance of more routinized rituals, however, 
a new kind of group identity became possible based on semantic schemas and 
procedural scripts that could be generalized to any member of the in-group, 
even to complete strangers. Simply wearing a certain mode of dress or 
hairstyle now revealed a lot about a person’s beliefs and practices. We could 
then make inferences on this basis about their trustworthiness, even people we 
had never met before. 
 Routinized rituals provide a foundation for social identification with large 
communities, capable of encompassing indefinitely many individuals singing 
from the same hymn sheet (literally as well as metaphorically). Expanding the 
size of the in- group in this way has implications for the scale on which people 
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can engage in cooperative behavior, establishing a basis for cooperation with 
strangers simply because they carry the insignia that display shared beliefs and 
practices. At the same time, however, ties based on identification fulfill 
different social functions from ties based on fusion. 
 While individuals are only capable of fusing with a small number of groups 
(typically two or three at most), it is possible to identify with a great many 
different groups. This means we can build a complex division of labour in 
which we shift flexibly between roles as changing social situations dictate. 
There is no limit on the size of groups with whom identification is possible. 
 The emergence and spread of the doctrinal mode was facilitated by the 
appearance of the first ever regular collective rituals, focused around daily 
production and consumption, and the spread of identity markers across larger 
populations, for instance in the form of stamp seals used for body decoration 
and more standardized pottery designs in the Neolithic Middle East 
(Whitehouse and Hodder 2010). The appearance and spread of routinized 
rituals seems to have been linked to the need for greater trust and cooperation 
when interacting with relative strangers. Consider the difficulties of 
persuading people you scarcely know that they should make long-term 
investments in your services based on a promise, or should pay taxes or tribute 
in return for protection or sustenance in times of need. In the absence of more 
detailed information about the trustworthiness of prospective trading partners 
or remote governors who promise protection by their militia, shared insignia 
proclaiming commitment to common beliefs and practices becomes a 
persuasive form of evidence. In such conditions, groups with routinized rituals 
capable of uniting large populations will tend to out-compete those who lack 
shared identity markers of this kind. 
Using Social Glue to Change the World 
My three wishes for the world may be granted as a consequence of 
understanding better the way social glue works. 
 The first of my wishes, recall, is to repair societies torn apart by civil war. 
People fight and die for the group because they are glued to each other in a 
particularly powerful way. True, people can be forced to fight on pain of torture 
or execution but coercion alone is a weak and unstable way of running an 
army. In a smoke-filled room in Misrata surrounded by eager young men with 
assault rifles, the head of the revolutionary forces looked intently at me from 
under his camouflaged cap: “I trained many soldiers for Gaddafi before I 
trained the men in this room,” he said. “And I tell you that one civilian who 
believes in the cause and will die for his comrades is more deadly than ten 
soldiers who kill for a wage.” 
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 One of the most powerful binding agents in the military may turn out to be 
shared dysphoria – the experience of enduring hardships together, whether in 
hazing rituals, grueling forms of training, or the experience of coming under 
fire. For thousands of years tribal groups seem to have exploited this 
mechanism by using terrifying and painful initiations to fuse together their 
fighting units and raiding parties. In civil conflicts the outgroup is not always 
the tribe next door – sometimes it is an organ of the state, such as the British 
army on Bloody Sunday or the Egyptian police at the beginning of the Arab 
Spring. But whoever the enemy happens to be, what drives us to fight them is 
not that they are in the wrong. We may point to this as a rationale but that’s 
not what really drives us. If we fought against dictators and thugs simply 
because they were in the wrong we’d all be at war, all the time. Rather, when 
we fight back against injustice it’s because we believe that its victims share our 
suffering. The victims are, in an important sense, one with us. So when we 
respond with violence it is little more than self-defense. 
 Shared dysphoria and the fusion of identities it produces are like an 
unexploded bomb – it takes only one careless move, such as an unprovoked 
attack by an outgroup, to unleash its lethal force. And so we should treat the 
presence of this kind of fusion in a population with the same respect that we 
treat a minefield. Just as mines can be detected and safely exploded, it should 
be possible also to monitor the fusion levels of communities, identifying those 
that could blow at any time, and harnessing their capacities for collective 
action in peaceful and consensual ways. That is more or less what happened in 
Derry, the site of Bloody Sunday — eventually. But did there need to be years 
of sectarian violence and appalling loss of life to make a peace process work? If 
this period of civil war could have been predicted surely it would have been 
better to begin tackling tribalism and building a more consensual system of 
governance before rather than after so many lives were lost? 
 Learning how to build social cohesion for the betterment of humanity is the 
key not only to granting my three wishes but to solving all collective action 
problems facing our species. Understanding how social glue works is the first 
step. At the moment we have many hypotheses but few hard facts. However, 
we are now engaged in a massive programme of research to test our hunches 
against the evidence – from the lab, from history, from buried civilizations, 
from the internet, from ordinary people going about their lives, and from 
soldiers on the battlefield. Our project hopes to unlock the secrets of social 
bonding and cooperation in humans. If only we could understand better how 
social glue works and what it does, we could harness the passions of the 
collective and rebuild the social organization of our species in more globally 
consensual ways. 
 True, we could continue trying to change the world by hunting down 
terrorists, bombing dictators, imposing economic sanctions on fundamentalist 
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states, and playing hardball around negotiating tables. But I believe we can 
change the world more, and more lastingly, by first understanding ourselves 
better. 
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William Swann. How Can Social Glue Foster Cooperation Rather 
than Competition? A commentary on Harvey Whitehouse  
University of Texas 
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In an audaciously ambitious article, Whitehouse proposes a solution to three of 
the world’s perennial problems: (a) predicting, preventing, and resolving civil 
wars; (b) channeling social cohesion for the collective good; and (c) mobilizing 
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a global response to economic inequality and environmental threat. The 
solution, he contends, is to buttress our understanding of something he calls 
“social glue”. 
 On the face of it, the core argument here seems plausible enough. That is, 
there is evidence that people who are identified or fused with groups are 
disposed to band together with other group members and make significant 
sacrifices for the group. Presumably, if one could expand the visions of group 
members so that they embraced “humanity” rather than their local group, the 
goals that Whitehouse laid out for us would be within reach. But how does one 
expand the horizons of group members in this way? Thus far, research has 
focused on the ways in which social glue fuels, rather than minimizes, divisions 
between people. For example, social identity researchers have repeatedly 
demonstrated that highly identified persons are biased toward the ingroup and 
against the outgroup, even when membership in the group is completely 
arbitrary. Similarly, the identity fusion literature has demonstrated that highly 
fused persons endorse fighting and dying for the ingroup against the outgroup. 
Such evidence suggests that social glue may contribute to intergroup 
competition and violence rather than cooperation and peace. 
 If I were looking for ways to make social glue foster cooperation rather 
competition, I might look in two places. Within the social psychological 
literature, Sheriff’s (1955) classic Robber’s Cave experiment showed that 
intergroup rivalry could be overcome by inducing rival groups to pursue the 
same superordinate goal. In a field experiment at a summer camp for boys, the 
researchers engineered a situation in which the only way for two groups of 
boys to achieve their goals was to cooperate with the rival group. Once the boys 
realized that they could achieve their own goals only by cooperating with a 
group they viewed as rivals, they set aside their differences and began working 
together. Soon, the barriers that had divided members of the two groups 
melted away and their relationships blossomed. Apparently, superordinate 
goals represent one means of fostering social glue. 
 For additional strategies for fostering social glue, I would look at Steven 
Pinker’s (2011) book, The Better Angels of Our Nature. Pinker argues that the 
rates of violence in the world have declined precipitously over the course of 
human history. He attributes this decline to several factors, the most 
important one being the rise of the modern state, which suppresses violence 
and settles disputes among its citizens. In this instance, the modern state does 
not directly foster social glue. Rather, by regulating behaviors that are known 
to foster suspicion, distrust, and violence, the modern state creates conditions 
that favor the development of glue among its members. 
 Pinker also identifies several additional methods through which societies 
have fostered social glue, including the empowerment of women, increases in 
literacy and communication, and the rise of international trade. Much like 
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superordinate goals, these factors have produced increases in empathy and 
better understanding of members of other groups, both of which may foster 
social glue. 
 In Pinker’s scenario, then, the monumental changes he depicts came about 
through both indirect and direct strategies working together: strong 
government to prevent or punish destructive behaviors and social 
psychological processes such as super-ordinate goals that serve to bind people 
together. Working together, such processes may produce the social glue that 
encourage the better angels of our nature to emerge. 
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In his target article Whitehouse describes a fascinating and extremely 
worthwhile program of research. We understand that this research is in its 
early stages, and so we are not too concerned that at the moment, his 
exposition of it raises many more questions for us than it answers. We offer up 
these questions, not really as criticisms, but more to help him communicate 
the value of his project by attempting to answer them in the future. 
1. How prevalent is identity fusion? 
The concept of identity fusion is introduced without any data (either 
here or – less forgivably – in the fuller treatment of the concept by 
Swann, Jetten, Gómez, Whitehouse, & Bastian, 2012) on how common 
a phenomenon it is, whether it takes place equally in men and women, 
the age at which it first takes place, etc. Without such data it is 
impossible to draw any conclusions on whether identity fusion is part 
of normal human development, or a localized reaction to extreme social 
circumstances. Hence, it is very difficult to assess its importance for 
human cooperation. 
2. How is identity fusion distinguished from social identification? 
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Whitehouse implies that identity fusion is logically distinct from social 
identification, because in the latter process the personal and social 
selves have a mutually inhibitory relationship, whereas in the former 
they have a complementary relationship. Yet social identification tends 
to be defined in very broad terms, simply as a feeling of belonging to a 
certain social category (Swann et al., 2012). Presumably, it is a 
prerequisite for feeling fused with a certain category that one should 
also feel that one belongs to that category. Therefore, identity fusion is 
not logically distinct from social identification, but an extreme form of 
social identification characterized by an abnormal relationship between 
the personal and social selves. Furthermore, it ought to be 
acknowledged that the personal and social selves are not as distinct, 
even in non-fused individuals, as Whitehouse suggests. The social self 
implies certain internal states (e.g., commitment to a social role, 
feelings of duty or obligation, feelings of guilt or shame), while the 
development of a ‘personal’ self relies on various kinds of information 
supplied by the social world, in forms such as internalized narratives 
(Vygotsky, 1986) and social comparison processes (Festinger, 1954).   
3. How does identity fusion relate to other motivations for altruism? 
Identity fusion is clearly not the only motivation for cooperative or 
humanitarian behaviour; yet Whitehouse occasionally comes close to 
claiming this, with statements like: 
 “when we fight back against injustice it’s because we believe that its 
victims share our suffering. The victims are, in an important sense, one 
with us. So when we respond with violence it is little more than self-
defense.” 
 This ignores the fact that many humans have an abstract, and 
probably innate, sense of justice (Walsh, 2000), which potentially 
applies equally to all other humans – or at least all other citizens – 
regardless of the extent to which one feels “fused” with them. (Was the 
heroism of the Fukushima nuclear workers really dependent on the fact 
that it was co-nationals who were the principal beneficiaries? Is it not 
more likely that as the only people qualified and on hand to deal with 
the crisis, they felt a sense of moral duty to humanity, and indeed the 
environment?) Proponents of identity fusion theory need to 
acknowledge that cooperation, cohesion and even self-sacrifice can all 
be achieved without any feelings of fusion: the latter just makes them 
more likely. 
4. Why are shared trauma and dysphoric rituals believed to be so 
important for identity fusion? 
Whitehouse clearly believes that shared trauma is vital for promoting 
identity fusion. However, while he offers anecdotal evidence that 
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trauma is a sufficient condition for fusion, he supplies no evidence that 
it is a necessary condition. A lot of the empirical research on identity 
fusion has taken place on individuals who have not in fact suffered any 
serious collective trauma (e.g. the Spanish participants of Gómez et al., 
2011). Similarly, events such as the Nuremberg rallies, which 
Whitehouse holds partially responsible for the high levels of identity 
fusion that were presumably characteristic of Nazi Germany, were not 
dysphoric but rather euphoric occasions. Thus it may be that it is high 
levels of emotional activation in general, not just activation of negative 
emotions, that are important. If trauma is not necessary for building 
social cohesion, we are left with the question of why it is necessary to 
have dysphoric rituals at all. One possibility is that they are a kind of 
test of how group members will behave under genuinely dangerous 
conditions (which would explain why they are so characteristic of 
initiation rituals). 
5. What are the key differences between fusing with a small group of 
known others (what Whitehouse describes as “local fusion”) and 
fusing with a large, impersonal group such as a nation or a religion? 
The target article does not explore the differences between the “local” 
and “extended” forms of identity fusion. We are sceptical that these 
really represent the same kind of process. Analyzing affiliation to an 
abstract category of nation or religion in terms of fusion with a vast 
group of unknown others seems problematic, because in such cases it is 
really the ideas that define the group, rather than vice versa. The group 
of one’s co-religionists, for example, tends to be defined subjectively as 
the set of all those who follow the principles of one’s religion correctly. 
People who socially identify with a particular religion but who are 
perceived as violating certain “sacred values” (Atran & Axelrod, 2008) 
of that religion will not be seen by the perceiver as fused with them; 
indeed, extremists’ most bilious outpourings of hate are often reserved 
for such individuals. Atran’s (2010) study of Islamic extremists is more 
sophisticated than simply relying on identity fusion, because it 
explicitly takes into account the interactions between young men’s 
social commitments to their comrades in arms, and their ideological 
commitments to the sacred values of their shared religion. 
6. How exactly can an examination of the ‘social glue’ produced by 
shared trauma be used to solve major social problems? 
Whitehouse proposes – without going into many details – that when we 
better understand the social glue of identity fusion we may learn to use 
it for peace. Yet if identity fusion is most likely to occur in the case of 
shared traumatic experiences (including dysphoric rituals), is it 
possible for it to work in circumstances devoid of any sort of trauma? 
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Will we need to inflict simulated trauma on ourselves in order to 
achieve collective fusion, and therefore peace? In this respect it may be 
fortunate that collective trauma does not in fact seem to be necessary 
for identity fusion (see Question 4). But another problem is that it will 
be very difficult, if not impossible, ever to achieve identity fusion with 
people who hold different sacred values from our own (see Question 5). 
 Perhaps, if these questions were answered satisfactorily, we would be more 
convinced of the unique value of identity fusion in explaining altruistic 
behaviour. As things stand, it seems more plausible to us that identity fusion is 
simply an extreme form of social identification (see Question 2), which 
naturally predicts extreme forms of social commitment (such as laying down 
one’s life for one’s countrymen) better than does simply stating whether one 
belongs to a particular social category. 
 Yet Whitehouse’s article is valuable in that it draws attention to the 
parallels between affiliation to small groups and affiliation to big cultural 
ideas. Perhaps, rather than invoking a specific construct of identity fusion, we 
may account for these parallels by falling back on the construct that inspired 
much of the work on social identification and identity fusion: that of 
attachment (Bowlby, 1969). There may indeed be a difference between groups 
to which we merely feel that we belong in an abstract sense (social 
identification), and those to which we also feel that we really belong (are 
attached) in an emotional sense. Attachment broadens considerably during 
childhood and adolescence as we become less dependent on close family 
members, and more dependent on first peers and then sexual partners. 
Although speculative, one possibility is that during a certain sensitive period in 
adolescence and early adulthood, it is also possible to become strongly 
attached to an idea (such as nationality or religion). It may be that reflection 
on dysphoric (or indeed euphoric) shared experiences plays a key role in this 
new attachment process. 
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There is much to admire in Whitehouse’s ambitious programme of 
research.  There is the testing of a theory that offers greater precision in 
describing and explaining social cohesion. There is the formulation of an 
account of psychological kinship that can serve as a reminder that cultural and 
evolutionary approaches can work together to produce compelling 
insights.  And there is the sense that, with such interdisciplinary collaboration, 
we stand on the verge of unprecedented progress in understanding the human 
condition.  Yet, while we can appreciate Whitehouse’s three wishes for the 
world, the move from descriptive to normative discourse faces significant 
ethical and practical challenges, necessitating a fourth wish. 
 Whitehouse’s essay makes clear that the theory of divergent modes of 
religiosity (Whitehouse 2001; 2004) is not so much a theory of religion but of 
social cohesion, and has important implications beyond organizations 
employing non-physical agent concepts, such as civil war armed groups 
(Whitehouse and McQuinn 2013). Sharing traumatic experiences forges 
intense bonds through psychological kinship while frequent repetition of 
semantic information produces less intense but more diffuse bonds of ethnic 
or pseudo-ethnic affiliation. This is progress both for the theory itself and for 
the field of the cognitive science of religion in that one of its theories has 
demonstrated a much wider significance for our understanding of societies. 
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 We often speak of the necessity and benefits of interdisciplinarity in the 
study of human life, but we also often face entrenched disciplinary boundaries 
and antipathy (Pinker 2002; McKinnon and Silverman 2005).  Whitehouse’s 
account of identity fusion as ‘psychological kinship’ (Swann et al 2012), which 
lies at the heart of the imagistic mode of cohesion (Lanman and Whitehouse in 
prep), utilizes the findings of both evolutionary psychology and socio-cultural 
anthropology and can serve as a reminder of the insights we can reach when 
we move past the more exclusionist rhetoric sometimes used by scholars in 
these fields. 
 Evolutionary psychologists have provided evidence of the importance of 
contextual cues, especially early co-residence, in the psychological perception 
of kinship and the altruistic dispositions that follow (Lieberman, Tooby et al. 
2007; Lieberman and Lobel 2012).  Socio-cultural anthropologists have 
provided evidence of the construction of kinship ties through specific 
contextual processes, such as shared residence and eating (Carsten 2004).  The 
available evidence from both fields tells us that human beings use fallible 
heuristic cues to determine likely genetic relatives for the purposes of altruism 
and incest avoidance.  Whitehouse’s insight is that traumatic rituals can 
provide these cues and produce in participants the impression that they share 
essential parts of themselves with other people; they can effectively make kin 
and they can do so in a much shorter timespan than co-residence.  If this claim 
is borne out by ongoing research, we will have demonstrated that insights of 
frequently opposed fields can be utilized together to make substantial progress 
in understanding one of the foundational topics of anthropology. 
 With such progress in our understanding of the human condition, however, 
come important questions about the uses of such understanding.  Whitehouse 
presents a relatively uncomplicated and optimistic picture with his three 
wishes.  Once we understand how social glue operates among human beings, 
we will be able to defuse violent movements and fuse billions of people with 
the notion of ‘humanity’, allowing us to solve the problems of poverty and 
climate change.  I can appreciate this vision but I believe that anytime one 
seeks to follow Marx in not just understanding the world but changing it (not 
to mention changing it for all of humanity!), one must face serious questions 
and challenges.  Whitehouse argues : “The more we understand these 
mechanisms the more we can do to curtail sectarian violence, genocide, and 
many other forms of civil conflict.” This assumes a ‘we’ that judges which civil 
wars to put down and which to support.   Who is included in this ‘we’?  How 
representative of the diverse moral visions of humanity will ‘we’ be?  How 
worthy of trust? 
 Similarly, Whitehouse argues that it would be beneficial for people to fuse 
with the concept of “humanity” as a whole.  “Humanity” is a relatively recent 
and universalizing identity term that potentially devalues existing ethnic and 
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religious identities, identities that both activists and many socio-cultural 
anthropologists view themselves as championing in a fight against 
globalization and cultural homogenization.  What is the content of this vision 
of ‘humanity’ with which people are to fuse?  What is it to be a human 
being?  Who has a seat at the table in deciding the content of this vision?  If we 
unreflectively assume the contemporary idealistic Western notion of humanity 
as a rational species working toward a world of individual freedom and mutual 
benefit (Taylor 2007), then other visions of humanity and its place in the world 
are marginalized.  We must be careful to demonstrate the differences between 
such a project and the enterprises of colonialism and the neo-liberal push of 
global capitalism, not just for obvious ethical reasons but also for the practical 
reason that socio-cultural anthropologists are needed for cross-cultural 
research on the topics addressed here and one risks alienating many of them 
with a vision of global transformation and unification. 
 For these reasons I would ask Whitehouse to consider asking the genie for a 
fourth wish. This wish would be to make the process of establishing the 
content of our vision of ‘humanity’ globally peaceful, representative, and 
consensual.  This, however, may be the hardest wish for our genie to grant. 
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Whitehouse’s article on social cohesion provides a mix of research agenda and 
aspirational vision. The research agenda springs from the “Ritual, Community, 
and Conflict” project that he directs, but Whitehouse also aspires to employ an 
advanced understanding of social cohesion to “predict, prevent, and resolve 
civil wars,” and to “mobilize a global response to economic inequality and 
environmental threat.”  As a student of social group dynamics I would be 
excited to see Whitehouse and colleagues succeed in this regard, however 
fraught the task. The forces of social cohesion are critical in explaining social 
change and thereby provide stepping-stones to applying our understanding to 
higher social goals.  With these goals in mind, I would like to consider how the 
types of social cohesion Whitehouse tables might influence societal evolution, 
and if and how such forces might be employed for a common good. 
 Before I start I would like to dispense with an issue of which Whitehouse is 
certainly very aware yet did not address in the target article, namely that the 
forces of social cohesion and those of social diversification are merely opposite 
sides of the same psychological coin.  Theoretical and empirical research bears 
this out.  Evolutionary theory shows that when the benefits of cooperation can 
be isolated to the same group that pays its costs, cooperation is more likely to 
arise and persist.  Countless empirical studies demonstrate that human 
cooperation is obsessively group focused, suggesting that in-group favoritism, 
parochial altruism, conditional reciprocity and related behaviors are the sorts 
of adaptations that have made human cooperation stable and human societies 
successful over evolutionary time.  Cultural group selection provides a succinct 
and efficient way of tracking the evolutionary linkages between individuals and 
groups, and it is of direct relevance to the evolution of cooperation, ritual and 
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institution.  I believe this broad region of group-centric cooperation, cultural 
evolution and adapted human psychology to be the relevant context for 
interpretation of Whitehouse’s article, and will return to the implications at the 
end. 
On types of social glue 
Whitehouse outlines two different mechanisms of social cohesion, identity 
fusion and social identification.  Identity fusion is a personal, emotional bond 
shared by small groups that have undergone intense and stressful shared 
experiences such as wars and initiation rituals.  Groups of individuals who 
have passed together through such events tend to have deep empathy for one 
another.  These groups are often willing to sacrifice to aid and protect their 
fellows.  This personal identity fusion differs in nearly every respect from 
symbolic “social identification,” which does not require intense personal 
experiences but is instead mediated by categorical relationships, rote ritual, 
symbolic markings and may extend across vast social groups much larger than 
could possibly undergo personal identity fusion.  While these symbolically 
marked social identities may include millions of individuals, they do so only 
weakly in comparison to the strength of commitment between people who 
have experienced intense shared events and become fused.  As a result, 
individuals may belong to great number of symbolic social identities, whereas, 
people only ever have one or a few personal identity fusions. 
 Personal identity fusion and symbolic social identification are, of course, 
categories of convenience created to simplify the empirical world.  Although 
they are extreme categories, with large grey zones and complex interactions, 
they are useful ones.  They are useful because they expose distinct social 
properties in a manner that makes it easier to understand how societies change 
over time.  Moreover, it seems that the two mechanisms of cohesion are not 
merely two extremes on a continuum, but, as can be seen in their links with 
euphoric vs. dysphoric ritual and imagistic vs. doctrinal social forms (Atkinson 
& Whitehouse, 2011; Whitehouse, 2002), the two mechanisms are also 
separable objects of empirical study. 
 To aid in considering the dynamical properties of these two social cohesion 
mechanisms (in preparation for building a theoretical model), it is useful to 
abstract or exaggerate their core differences.  The purpose here is to consider 
the properties of two pure types of glue, so that we may consider their 
application, interactions and dynamical properties more clearly.  I see five 
dimensions along which these two mechanisms of social cohesion differ, at 
least in theory. 
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 Group size – Symbolic social identity may extend to millions of strangers, 
while personal identity fusion may only occur within relatively small groups 
with whom it is directly possible to share an experience. 
 Exclusivity – Humans may simultaneously belong to many social groups, 
each symbolically marked in various ways, but seldom undergo identity fusion 
and when they do it is an exclusive formation, not usually open to further 
members. 
 Cooperative strength – Both fused identities and social identities carry the 
capacity to elicit altruism and cooperation from group members, but the 
individuals whose identities have been ‘fused’ are usually willing to sacrifice 
more for their fellows than are individuals of the same large social group. 
 Symbolic membership – Social identities are often denoted with special 
symbols and language, or social markers.   Social markers and other outward 
cues of belonging may be imitated or used strategically for the benefit of 
individuals and groups.  Fused personal identities, on the other hand, derive 
membership from involvement in the defining event, and may not be imitated 
or manipulated as easily because members recognize each other personally. 
 Primary driver – Fused groups emerge largely as a consequence of 
traumatic events (be they ritual, catastrophe or war), while symbolic social 
identities arise, persist and spread through a combination of social processes 
including cultural diffusion and institutional dynamics. 
 Before coming to rest on the dynamical aspects, I will make a few notes 
about these two mechanisms.  Personal identity fusion is by its nature 
inversely related to group size and physical distance, but positively related to 
catastrophe, conflict and death.  While dysphoric hazing and initiation rituals 
make personal identity fusion a force that can be employed by societies and 
institutions, it is significant that in peacetime most of the fusion events that a 
person experiences may be exogenous to symbolic social 
groupings.  Childhood, the physical challenge of survival and intra-group 
conflict likely provide the majority share of fusion events in peacetime, and 
many of these events occur frequently and perpetually in human life.  This 
background frequency provides an important baseline of regional social 
cohesion against which the effects of ritual and institution and fusion due to 
inter-group conflict may be compared.  Furthermore, it is possible that above a 
certain frequency of intense events even a large population may become 
“fused,” in a chainmail fashion.  Such a linkage could enable warfare or 
peaceful collective action such as the civil rights movement. 
 By contrast, the symbolic markers of social identity may be used 
strategically by group members and outsiders alike.  Symbolic markers are ripe 
material for cultural evolutionary processes.   Social identity markers may 
often arise endogenously (Efferson, Lalive, & Fehr, 2008), are prone to 
psychological mechanisms of imitation (Mesoudi, 2009), and are strengthened 
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at social group boundaries (McElreath, Boyd, & Richerson, 2003).  Moreover, 
symbolic social identities such as those that designate large religious 
populations may have played a key role in the expansion of human cooperation 
in the last 10,000 years (Henrich et al., 2010).  Thus, symbolic social identity 
would seem to be more directly susceptible to cultural evolutionary forces than 
fused personal identities, even when dysphoric fusion rituals are accounted 
for. 
On mixing glues 
To explore the dynamic influences of these types of social cohesion, it may be 
most instructive to explore a few of their possible interactions. 
 First, the two cohesive forces may often align.  Alignment occurs when 
fusion events occur within a population delimited by its symbolic social 
identity.  The amount of personal fusion occurring within a symbolic group 
may in fact be a more useful way to conceptualize social resilience.  Ibn 
Khaldun called collective solidarity within a group asabiyya, and Turchin 
(2003) extended and enriched Khaldun’s theory of the growth and decline of 
empires by creating mathematical models of the interaction between asabiyya, 
populations, and political boundaries.  Khaldun’s verbal model and Turchin’s 
mathematical models suggest that asabiyya was strongest within small social 
groups and on social boundaries.  Successful groups grow in population and 
space until they create vast cultural heartlands within which social 
homogeneity allows asabiyya to wane due to a lack of contact with other social 
groups.  Eventually, an over-extended empire may collapse and be replaced by 
one that emerges from border areas.  Mapping our two glues onto this pattern, 
asabiyya becomes the frequency or strength of personal identity fusion 
occurring within a symbolic social group.  In small social groups and 
borderlands it is more likely that fusion events will involve interactions with 
other social identities, and thereby come to reinforce the strength of the 
existing symbolic boundaries.  In ethnic heartlands, symbolic differentiation is 
low and thus cannot drive fusion events.  Any fusion events that do occur will 
not occur across symbolic social boundaries, because there are none, and the 
personal fusion component of collective solidarity wanes. 
 Next, the two types of social glue may compete on various time scales.  In a 
related interview, Whitehead suggests that rituals employing the two types of 
social cohesion may be competing over evolutionary time as design features in 
social systems (Jones, 2013).  He states that low frequency intense rituals have 
been eliminated in modern social groups because they are powerful and 
destabilize larger social structures.  This may be because symbolic social 
identities grow to include very large populations, and may control a larger 
share of observed cohesion.  Symbolic social identities are also more prone to 
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cultural evolutionary forces than are fusion events and rituals.  It may be then 
that the corpus of beliefs and customs that compose a large society tends to 
become dominated more by the types of rituals that can be easily transmitted 
and imitated, causing symbolic social identities to grow by contrast to 
personally fused identities. 
 Or, it may be that for the same reasons, practices exploiting symbolic 
cohesion spread fast while those exploiting identity fusion cohesion spread 
slowly.  This last possibility would predict a U-shaped relationship between the 
fraction of cohesion that derives from identity fusion and time as symbolic 
processes at first outstrip fusion processes, which then eventually regain. 
 These speculative interactions between the two types of social cohesion and 
between the associated types of ritual may be tested theoretically (with 
models) and empirically (as Whitehouse is doing currently).  Related research 
questions include: 
 What is the baseline frequency of personal fusion events in peaceful 
times? 
 What is the maximum group size that can hold a fusion event? 
 What frequency of smaller fusion events is necessary to create the 
chainmail-like effect, or asabiyya? 
 What is the difference in cooperative strength between identify fusion 
and symbolic identification when measured experimentally? 
 Does the average correlation between fusion and symbolic identity (i.e. 
asabiyya) tend to vary across social scales, and if so, which scale leads 
to most cohesion, and which scale minimizes the chances of war? 
 What measures of “social scale” are most relevant (e.g. population size, 
social network measures, etc)? 
 What factors control the long-term evolutionary interactions between 
the dysphoric rituals that generate identity fusion and the more 
frequent scripted doctrinal rituals that help secure symbolic 
identification? 
On applying social glues 
The aspirational content of Whitehouse’s article is, of course, hopeful in the 
extreme.  Even ignoring the ethical black hole it conjures, we do not know if 
social cohesion can be effectively manipulated at all, let alone to positive social 
outcomes. But Whitehouse asks the right question, and I believe his categories 
of glue can be used constructively.  So, how might one hypothetically apply the 
forces of social cohesion to constructive societal outcomes?  I have two 
comments in this regard. 
 First, how might we use this knowledge to avoid war?  If Whitehouse is 
correct that symbolic social cohesion has enabled the expansion of human 
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society, then we should look to applying it for its more inclusive properties 
over the more exclusive and local process of identity fusion.  However, we must 
always expect that at least a baseline level of fusion cohesion will occur.  Also, 
the situation to be most avoided is when identity fusion events unfold across 
symbolic social identity boundaries, building social tension.  This condition is 
often a precursor to revolution or war, and always a consequence.  Therefore, 
societies should avoid situations where fusion events occur across symbolic 
social identity boundaries.  The problem is boiling this mechanism down to a 
tip – to stop war, stop people of different social groups from fighting each 
other – makes mighty weak tea.  Perhaps, as the research matures, Whitehouse 
will be in a better position to elaborate. 
 Finally, we return to the proper context – the evolution of cooperation, 
group functional rituals and cultural traits.  As I mentioned earlier, there is 
abundant evidence that the evolved human capacities for social cohesion are 
tightly tied with the human proclivity to mark, segregate and discriminate 
between people of different types.  When we think of glue, we think of applying 
it to hold things together.  The problem with social glue, however, is that it 
binds one sub-population at the expense of a rift in the larger population.  That 
is, neither type of social glue necessarily generates new, additional 
cohesion.  Rather, human social cohesion seems to act in more of a 
thermodynamic way, extracting cohesion from one source and accumulating it 
in another.  It seems better to me to approach application from a more 
fundamental level, when we ask the question, “what factors can retard the 
processes of social segregation or ethnogenesis?” or “which mechanisms add to 
total cohesion across social groups?”  Two such mechanisms may be migration 
(Richerson & Boyd, 2008) and economic equality (Baland, Bardhan, & Bowles, 
2007; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). 
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I am quite enthusiastic about Whitehouse’s research program, an impressive 
body of empirical work in a variety of cultural contexts and using multiple 
methods, exploring diverging modes of religiosity and ritual practice and their 
implications for social structure.  I’m delighted to have been asked to respond 
to his post. 
 I find Whitehouse’s divergent modes hypothesis of ritual function and 
social structure both intuitively reasonable and well supported.   There are a lot 
of complexities still to be explained, but a good start has been made on what is 
likely to be a long and fruitful research project. I’ll confine my response to this 
specific post to three points.  The first, an expansion of something I wrote in 
response to an earlier post on this blog, which is to address the problematic 
nature of the rather loose term ‘ritual’ as used historically by anthropologists 
and to assert that ‘causally opaque’ is not a useful definition of ‘ritual’. The 
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second is to suggest an expansion of the divergent modes of religiosity 
program to include synthesis with the study of how people behave and make 
decisions around values constructed as ‘sacred’.  The final point I would like to 
make is actually a word of caution around the development of more 
sophisticated techniques of social control. Whitehouse presents here a positive 
picture of how this knowledge could be applied without addressing how 
different actors with different access to power and different motivations might 
use such knowledge for other ends than the public good. 
 As I began my own research on ‘ritual’ at UC Davis, I immediately came up 
against the problem of definition with which many others have wrestled. I find 
it hard to argue that the anthropological record is coherent around the 
definition of the term ‘ritual’, except perhaps the Durkheimian idea of those 
things that we Westerners don’t know how to explain through obvious 
material/economic purpose. 
 ‘Ritual’ is a folk category. It is a box in which we lump all sorts of interesting 
behaviors which grab our attention, yet whose purpose is not materially 
obvious to ourselves, the anthropologists doing the studying. It is like the 
kitchen junk drawer in which you put all sorts of things that you don’t already 
have a place for. There are a lot of interesting things in the junk drawer, but 
their only relation to each other is that they don’t fit in our other tidy 
categories… they are ‘causally opaque’ to us. As such, I don’t think there is 
much hope for some sort of general theory of ‘ritual’ per se. Some researchers 
find a functional role for ritual in the formation and stability of groups at 
different scales (Atkinson & Whitehouse, 2011)(Barth, 1990)(McNeill, 
1995)(Sosis & Bressler, 2003)(McElreath, Boyd, & Richerson, 2003), others 
assert that rituals destabilize large hierarchical structures (Ehrenriech, 2007), 
others demonstrate how rituals store locally specific functional ecological 
knowledge (Lansing & Kremer, 1993)(Rappaport, 1967), yet others find ritual 
to cause cognitive dysfunction (Legare & Souza, 2012), and on and on. They 
are all perhaps correct, but this is arguably because they have drawn distinct 
objects out of the conceptual box we call ‘ritual’. There are a lot of interesting 
objects in this box, but I suspect it is going to be much more fruitful to then 
explore theories of the different, specific  social ‘objects’ in this box than to try 
to argue for a general theory of those things which are causally opaque to the 
anthropologist performing the study. While Whitehouse still refers to this 
definition, I actually think it is one of the interesting things about his research 
program that it begins to differentiate objects in the box based on features 
other than opacity to the researcher. For example, as Atkinson and 
Whitehouse get more specific about euphoric/dysphoric activities, frequency, 
arousal level, they find correlations in the ethnographic literature between low 
frequency and high arousal ‘rituals’ and small scale societies and between high 
frequency low arousal rituals and larger scale societies. Getting similarly more 
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specific, McNeil and also Kirschner and Tomasello (Kirschner & Tomasello, 
2010) find that synchronized rhythmic activity leads to increased prosociality 
(likely in-group limited). This will be entirely unrelated to the social or 
psychological effects of an augury ritual that does not involve synchronized 
movement, like drawing a card from a deck and reflecting on one’s life in 
relationship to its imagery. We find both activities in the folk category of 
‘ritual’, but there isn’t much more that unifies them except the common 
perception of their mysterious function from the perspective of a cultural 
outsider. 
 The category ‘ritual’ reflects less on the unity of the phenomena in the 
category than on the cognitive biases of those creating the category, Heinrich 
et al’s WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) 
people (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). WEIRD people, who have 
dominated not just anthropology, but western academia in general, are 
psychologically shaped by a culturally novel mythology of radical individualism 
which perhaps renders opaque the social psychology of many different 
activities, which to others may be obvious from both internal experience and 
observed patterns of behavior in their communities. To whom, if anyone, is the 
activity supposed to be ‘causally opaque’ to be called a ritual?  Is the causal 
opacity somehow necessary for the function? 
 A perhaps more fundamental problem with trying to find a theory of ‘ritual’ 
using this definition of ‘obscurity of function’ as one’s definition is that the 
behavior of interest might not be confined to the box. For example, McNeil 
points out that some synchronized rhythmic activities, like folk dances or 
certain religious practices, have no clear economic purpose to the outsider 
(and thus tend to be called ‘rituals’), but others are parts of functional 
economic activity, like Japanese fishermen rhythmically pulling in a net or 
military drills. Their purpose to an outsider is causally clear, but they have the 
same psychological effects as the more causally opaque variants. One might 
say that there is a layering of the obvious and the obscure with the fishermen, 
however the fishermen are likely quite aware of the social effects of their 
activities… it is hard to miss from the inside, the experience of camaraderie 
that comes with team work. As McNeil points out, the social function of the 
close order drill has certainly been clear to military professionals who 
continued its use well past the point in history when it’s material training 
function was no longer relevant. 
 One could point to many groups who use synchronized activities with no 
sense of ‘obscurity of purpose’, very intentionally using the practice to bond 
groups. Modern military drills, Native American powwow or potlatch dances, 
and allegiance-forming dance events in Papua New Guinea are a few quick 
examples. Goebbels’ social choreography at Nuremberg was certainly not 
causally opaque to Goebbels, but was done quite explicitly with an 
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understanding of group formation. It was also probably not causally opaque to 
those involved, and many are struck in a visceral way with an obviousness of 
social function when watching Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will.  ‘Ritual’ is 
best seen as a conceptual grab bag in which we can find specific behaviors like 
high arousal dysphoric activities or synchronized rhythmic activities to study 
and about which to create social and psychological theories. I suspect that a 
general theory of ritual is bound to either fail or not be usefully specific in its 
predictions. Whitehouse has demonstrated that theories of high arousal 
dysphoric activities and low arousal, repetitive activities have significant 
promise. 
 The second point I would like to make is a suggestion of what may turn out 
to be a very useful research question: how do different ritual forms bring 
participants to categorize specific rhetorical stances or norms as ‘sacred’? 
When something is seen as ‘sacred’ people’s behavior in relation to that thing 
becomes qualitatively different from other contexts: behavior becomes more 
unbending (Rappaport, 1999).  Where the ‘profane’ may be subject to trade-
offs and negotiation, conflicts around the sacred potentially become 
irreconcilable, or at least not subject to normal notions of economic trade-offs 
(Atran, 2010). In today’s world, we see many politically important examples 
where different groups’ notions of the sacred come into conflict, causing 
violent conflict and a consequent entrenching of stances. 
 While we are beginning to understand how ‘sacredness’ affects decision-
making and negotiation, we have hardly begun to look at how a notion of the 
sacred arises in the first place. I suspect that there will be some very fruitful 
explorations in the next years that will help shed light on how people become 
bonded not just to other people but to ideas.  As Whitehouse writes about 
‘fusing with a belief system’ and how ‘routinization seems to suppress 
reflection, in effect producing more slavish conformity to group norms’, it is 
very easy to extrapolate to the manufacturing of the sacred through a synthesis 
of group ritual and rhetoric. Sacred values are characterized by an 
unquestionability, an inhibition of critically reflection.  If we can find empirical 
support for the idea that specific kinds of routinization lead to suppression of 
reflection (and perhaps this already exists in the research of Whitehouse and 
his colleagues), we may have the beginning of an understanding of the 
dynamics of sacredness. 
 Finally, I would like to complicate Whitehouse’s picture of where an 
increase in technical understanding of social control might bring us. I 
appreciate Whitehouse’s bold assertion of the possible good of this research, as 
he presents a vision of the science of ritual leading to a better society. I feel 
motivated by a similar vision. However, I personally proceed cautiously, 
knowing that as I generate knowledge through public institutions, I relinquish 
control over who has access to that power. While I think that the attempt to 
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derive practical, applied understandings of the social function of rituals is 
going to be challenging, the potential success of the endeavor gives me as much 
pause as the potential failure. Whitehouse writes about the prevention of civil 
war, but sometimes a civil war is initiated to overthrow a tyrant.  Using an 
understanding of the social function of ritual to disrupt group bonding in order 
to prevent civil war resembles a picture of an oppressive government achieving 
greater social control as much as it does one of a benevolent society inhibiting 
dysfunctional fissioning. Something similar could be said for the use of group 
bonding ritual by those in power to consolidate group commitment to an 
oppressive, authoritarian state.  Goebbels is certainly a clear self-aware 
historical example of the latter.  The Cointelpro program of the FBI in the 
United States, used to disrupt civil rights, anti-war, and socialist groups, is an 
example of the former.  Where would civil rights be in the US, now, if the FBI 
had applied more effective tools than they did for disrupting social 
organizations like the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Martin 
Luther King Jr? We aspire to a kind of benign, collaborative social engineering 
as we increase public knowledge of the social effects of ritual, but we should 
understand that this knowledge will be applied by the different political actors, 
potentially for cross purposes. 
 It is sometimes perhaps an academic fantasy that one’s social science 
research will have some sort of potential application in the world, but to earn 
our public paychecks, it behooves us to act as if it will. However, we have every 
reason to suspect that any functionally useful knowledge we produce, should 
we succeed in producing it, will be used asymmetrically by people in positions 
of power to consolidate their power. We should not proceed blindly forward 
guided by rosy fantasies of how benevolent governments will use power purely 
for the public good.  If we do have an intention of generating knowledge of 
socio-political dynamics in order to facilitate the public good, we have to think 
about how that understanding might be used by existing institutions and 
specifically aim for the development of social techniques that are structurally 
constrained from being utilized for oppressive purposes (Sharp, 2002).  Some 
of the organizing strategies of the Arab Spring may be a beginning, but 
obviously as we look to Libya and the fallout into Mali, we aren’t there yet. 
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Whitehouse convincingly argues for a distinction between two kinds of social 
glue – identity fusion and social identification. In his earlier work he related 
these to two memory systems, semantic and episodic (Whitehouse 2000). 
Here I take a different tack by briefly reviewing two modes of social interaction 
familiar to linguists and sociologists – the informal (or intimate) and the 
formal — and considering how they may be major ingredients in the two kinds 
of glue. 
 Two modes of interaction. Many languages distinguish between informal 
and formal in their second person pronouns. In contrast to the basic, 
unmarked, informal “you,” the formal “you” may treat the individual and his 
social role as separate personalities, addressing the listener as a plurality — the 
French polite vous (you plural) — or in the third person — the German Sie or 
Italian lei (she). The informal/formal distinction may also show up as a 
difference in address – “Lizzie” or “dude” versus “Miss Bennett,” “Your 
Excellency,” “Your Holiness,” or “Professor.” The same distinction is evident in 
different strategies for making polite requests. Positive politeness makes a 
claim to intimacy (“Brother, can you spare a dime?”), negative politeness 
shows deference (“Sir, might I trouble you …?”) (Brown and Levinson 1987, 
Pinker 2007). The contrast also extends to clothing, comportment, and other 
social interactions outside language, with the formal mode in each case being 
more heavily scripted and allowing less room for improvisation. 
 Consider in more detail what intimacy involves. Intimacy among humans 
presumably has some of the same neurohormonal bases as bonding in other 
species. But there also seems to be a uniquely human cognitive side to intimate 
I-thou interactions, involving the effort to establish shared intentions 
(Tomasello et. al. 2005). This has been long studied in the field of linguistic 
pragmatics (Pinker 2007). By way of illustration: suppose Fred and Wendy 
Smith are a couple we know, and I tell you, “I saw Wendy kissing a man in the 
park yesterday.” You are likely to infer that the man was not Fred. Why? I 
could just as easily have said, “I saw Wendy kissing Fred in the park 
yesterday.” Since I didn’t, presumably I meant to imply that the man wasn’t 
Fred. This conclusion is not a logical deduction but a pragmatic inference, 
where you infer meanings that I encourage you to infer. Pragmatic inference, 
and shared intentions in general, depend on common knowledge (a term of art 
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from game theory: not just what we both know, but what we both know we 
both know). Our common knowledge in this case includes our particular 
knowledge of Fred and Wendy, and our general knowledge of the maxim that a 
cooperative speaker tries to supply as much relevant information as possible, 
other things being equal. Similar reasoning leads you to conclude that when I 
say something we know in common to be literally untrue (“What wonderful 
weather for a picnic,” or “Death is the mother of beauty”) I am speaking 
ironically or metaphorically. 
 Formal interactions may involve pragmatic inference as well, but they 
involve more centrally another uniquely human specialization, that of treating 
other people as occupants of social roles, apart from their personal qualities 
(Bloch 2008). This dramaturgic faculty depends not so much on developing 
shared intentions through one-off improvisation, as on following 
conventionalized interactional scripts, including sheer rote, as in the army, 
where “We salute the uniform, not the man.” 
 Two kinds of glue. I suggest that in rituals involving identity fusion and 
social identification, the psychologies of informal and formal interactions, 
respectively, are activated, although these psychologies are also active in many 
non-ritual exchanges. 
 Consider identity fusion rituals. While most or (by definition?) all rituals 
involve some degree of formalization, this class of ritual seem less concerned 
with getting the ritual exactly right or exactly the same as last time, and more 
concerned with changing participants for life – not just gluing them together, 
but melting them down and reforging them. To some extent, identity fusion 
rituals achieve this result through pain, ecstasy, and other high arousal states. 
But there is also a cognitive side to these rituals, which (I suggest) comes from 
their activating a process of pragmatic inference. As Whitehouse notes “a car 
crash or even a traumatic experience on the battlefield [may] provoke a rather 
limited array of reflections.” I suggest that identity fusion rituals are different 
from crashes and war trauma because they are understood as symbolic acts 
aimed at generating shared intentions. The intended meanings behind ritual 
symbolism may be obscure, triggering a lasting open-ended process of 
rumination. (“We have always fought wild pigs. But the initiator said that we 
initiates are wild pigs who must be killed. He couldn’t have meant it literally, 
so maybe he meant … or maybe …”) The episodic memory of shared extreme 
experiences and the ongoing pondering of “What did he mean by that?” seem 
to intensify social cohesion. While intense, intimate bonds develop without 
rituals sometimes – between mother and child for example – with identity 
fusion rituals they can extend further. 
 Social identity rituals, by contrast, involve more scripted behavior, and the 
significance of this behavior is more likely to be spelled out, rather than left 
open to pragmatic inference, as we would expect for formal social interactions. 
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 How does this contribute to understanding the social evolution of ritual? As 
Whitehouse notes, although fusion is sometimes extended to very large 
impersonal groups, the tendency is to shift to social identity rituals in the 
doctrinal mode as societies grow more complex. Why is this? Why is the 
routinization of charisma the rule in large-scale societies? The evidence from 
linguistics and related areas suggests one possible partial answer: the formal 
mode is employed not just in interactions with socially distant individuals 
(where formality is expected on both sides), but in interactions with one’s 
superiors (who are not obliged to be formal in return; they may answer your 
vous with a tu.) It may be, then, that social identity rituals are more compatible 
with the social stratification found in complex societies. By contrast, identity 
fusion rituals make for more social solidarity, but they also threaten to melt 
down hierarchies (Ehrenreich 2007). Attempts at extended fusion – as, for 
example, in messianic and millenarian movements — are likely to be regarded 
with suspicion by the powers that be, unless they are directed outward against 
external enemies, or diverted into harmless channels, like Saturnalia or 
Carnival. 
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Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can 
change the world; indeed, it’s the only thing that ever has. 
—Margaret Mead 
 
Harvey Whitehouse argues that we will be better able to resolve major 
challenges of the 21st century—civil wars, collective action, poverty, and 
environmental change—if we understand the “social glue” that binds people 
together in common cause. In the past, research on this idea has been 
dominated by social identity theory (SIT), in which individuals identify with 
and favor ingroups.  Whitehouse and colleagues suggest that SIT applies well 
enough to large, anonymous groups, but fails to capture perhaps the most 
powerful social glue of all: that which occurs in small groups undergoing 
danger or hardship—a different phenomenon they call “identity fusion”.  In 
identity fusion, individuals and groups effectively melt into one entity, 
permitting extraodinary levels of cooperation and altruism. SIT has been a 
bedrock concept in social psychology for decades, and we welcome the 
opportunity to rethink and bash the paradigm.  We are fully onboard 
Whitehouse’s boat, but want to paddle in a slightly different direction. 
 First, we think identity fusion highlights a major problem with SIT: how 
membership in one group overlaps with memberships in other groups.  Social 
identity theory is problematic because it fails to predict how people will behave 
when there are multiple overlapping groups, and identify fusion offers an 
opportunity to sort out this deficiency.  It offers predictions for when the glue 
will be strongest, not least because fused identities trump social identities 
when small groups share traumatic experiences. 
 Second, while identify fusion expands the SIT paradigm, we see fused 
identity and social identity not as different types of social glue, but rather as 
having different levels of stickiness.  Individuals’ level of identification with 
groups follows a continuum, from national identity that we have whether we 
like it or not (some reject it), to teams of fire-fighters, say, whose group 
integration is a matter of life or death. Social identity is usually just glue, and 
sometimes fails to do anything.  Identity fusion is superglue, and often has 
amazing outcomes. 
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When Does Glue Becomes Superglue? 
We think the notion of a continuum of levels of stickiness can help to reconcile 
Whitehouse’s argument that there are two types of glue, with the counter-
argument that there is only one glue, making identity fusion a version of social 
identity (see Ingram and Prochownik’s commentary).  We suggest that identity 
fusion explains interpersonal relations according to context.  In the absence of 
groups, the notion of fused identity still seems to have a role as evinced by 
Whitehouse’s example of “survivor bonds”.  But in group contexts, while fused 
identities may tend to occur in smaller groups, those individuals who make up 
that group inevitably belong to some of the same wider ingroups.  In this way, 
fused identity seems located within social identity to an extent (which can 
vary), and not necessarily an alternative.  Of course, Swann and others argue 
that identity fusion is empirically different from social identity, so there are 
two things to explain.  But this may be a failing of definitions of social identity 
rather than of the concept itself (see also Ingram’s follow up comment). 
 But how might a fused identity arise from a social identity?  Such a question 
is key for those of us who are interested in explaining the process of 
radicalisation, and hinges on the assumption that there are different levels of 
‘groupness’.  This problem is, we think, indicative of our own scholarly identity 
confusion:  not knowing whether and how to separate an individual-as-a-
group-member from a range of possible groups (social identities) that seem 
inextricably linked to one another, yet are also distinct in different 
contexts.  Where does a fused identity start and a social identity end? 
 A good example of this might be the army unit, the regiment, the service 
(army vs. navy etc.), and the nation.  The unit is fused having endured the 
same costly rituals, training, and sharing the same type of traumatic 
experiences of combat (Rielly, 2000).  But this small group of individuals, so 
tightly bonded, are also members of the wider armed forces, who are distinct 
from the civilians they are fighting to protect within their nation, of which they 
are also members.  Whilst the unit itself is likely to be most tightly fused, the 
fused group still has intimate ties with these larger, and more inclusive 
ingroups.  These ingroups are examples of social identities.  Of course, the 
argument may arise that they are members of “external identities” (one 
category of identity fusion), but is there enough to differentiate between 
external identity and social identity? 
From Social to Fused Identity 
The question then becomes, beyond a highly indoctrinated training 
programme utilising rituals and shared experiences (such as military training), 
or the direct experience of extreme hardship or danger, how do people form 
fused identities within, or even against the grain of, social identities?  Here we 
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return to the process of social identity and suggest that individuals who 
vicariously experience, say, injustice or prejudice on account of their group 
membership (social identity) are likely to try and interpret these events 
through the lens of that group membership (see Ginges and Atran 2011).  So, 
for example, I may not have been in Derry on bloody Sunday, but I was 
personally traumatized by the killing of my Catholic brothers. Social identity 
helps people understand this injustice according to their group membership—
thus the very interpretation of events are increasingly based on group 
membership rather than individual experience (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; 
Deschamps, 1982; Hewstone and Jaspars, 1982; Tajfel, 1979; Cairns, 1982; 
Rabbie and Horwitz, 1982; Van Knippenberg, 1978). 
 It could well be this process of viewing the world through an ingroup lens 
that enables, in fact, some degree of identity fusion with a set of likeminded 
others, particularly in groups that may not have been particularly salient 
before a particular nasty event (such as Bosnians before the Serbian 
invasion).  If so, identity fusion may begin to explain the notion of saliency of 
social identity (i.e. how important to the self-concept the group membership 
is) and interpersonal relationships within an ingroup that may lead to 
fractions.  This is important to understand involvement in extremist and 
terrorist groups.  Often terrorists are not directly affected by the events that 
underlie their grievances, but they are sufficiently impacted by the suffering of 
fellow ingroup members that they are prepared to die for the cause. 
Self- versus Other-Centricities  
Whitehouse differentiates the way in which social identity in individuals, and 
fused identity in individuals, enable the perception of other members of the 
ingroup.  Social identity tends to lead to the deindividuation and 
homogenisation of others within the ingroup as group members rather than as 
individuals, whilst fused identities are porous, resulting in more vicariousness 
of experiences of other (fused) group members who are nevertheless 
recognised as unique individuals (Hornsey, 2008; Swann, et al., 2013).  As 
Whitehouse suggests, fused and social identities appear to serve different 
functions. The process of identity fusion may enable a sort of other-concern, 
which enhances feelings of empathy towards ingroup members (although to 
what extent is not clear—i.e. to fused identity others or wider ingroup others?), 
whilst social identification triggers self-concern, since the status of the group is 
reflected in the individuals’ self concept (although see Brewer (1991) for an 
alternative to self concept). 
 But in the absence of context (that is, different levels of groupness) it is 
difficult to say whether this would change.  For instance, a study by Hein et al. 
(2010) showed that individuals in a group who experienced and then watched 
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others (ingroup and outgroup members) experience electric shocks had more 
activation in the empathy areas of their brains (anterior insula and anterior 
cingulate cortex) when watching ingroup rather than outgroup members 
receiving the same shocks.  Group membership was football team supporters 
and subjects were tested in pairs.  Would the shared suffering of group 
membership and electric shocks lead to some type of fused identity?  Or were 
results simply based on group membership?  We cannot be sure, but certainly 
there is a link between the two since there was a difference in activation and 
behavioural responses according to group membership.  Interestingly, 
empathy was also triggered, albeit on a lesser scale and much less frequently, 
when outgroup members suffered too and this effect was mediated by positive 
personal opinions of the outgroup individual.  There may be hope for us as a 
species yet. 
Putting Social Glue to Use 
In sum, identity fusion is a very welcome and much needed addition to social 
identity theory that can shed light on some of the crucial, yet underdeveloped 
concepts it is hinged on.  We suggest that identity fusion operates within the 
rubric of social identity—an extreme form of social identity—in which rather 
than the group taking over the individual, the group becomes a vessel for the 
individuals to be bonded together rather than bonded to the group.  The glue is 
not sticking them to a group concept, but to each other directly.  This enables 
us to see how an individual may go from self-centric yet group-oriented (via 
social identity), to other-centric yet individual-centric (via identity 
fusion).  Finally, it highlights an important limitation of social identity theory 
which is the inability to deal with multiple groups within groups and how those 
different groups might be separated from one another. Identity fusion sticks 
where mere social identity breaks. 
 If identity fusion is a superglue version of social identity, then what are the 
implications for Whitehouse’s three wishes of resolving civil war, collective 
action, poverty and environmental threats?  On the one hand, it may bring 
these wishes closer to the realms of possibility.  If the vicarious exposure to 
injustice and prejudice—to an ingroup as a whole—can achieve some degree of 
identity fusion, then we may be able to make social glue stickier without 
putting people through traumatic experiences themselves.  Information, 
presentation, and framing of good and bad events may be even more critical 
than we thought.  On the other hand, it suggests that we have an additional 
obstacle, because in a globalizing world of broadening as well as narrowing 
groups (federalism versus devolution, migration versus ghettoization, world 
unions versus highly specific online groups), everyone is suffering from an 
increasing confusion of identities—family, party, religion, state, nation, social 
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network, west, east and so on.  With so many strings of glue we may be pulled 
in  counter-productive and unpredictable directions.  Finally, we should not 
see social glue as a panacea.  Roosevelt and Stalin got along well enough when 
they had a common enemy in Hitler (and Japan).  No glue was necessary for 
remarkable levels of cooperation.  But once Hitler was gone, the world was 
divided for decades by the communist block and the free world.  There may be 
challenges of such gravitas that no glue is necessary to pull people together in 
common cause, as well as divisions of such perceived importance that no glue 
can bind them together. 
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Harvey Whitehouse. More On Social Glue: A Response 
to Commentaries 
 
The discussions in this forum have raised some big issues, ranging from the 
implications of two types of social glue for the evolution of groups (e.g. 
Waring; Smith) to the practical and ethical challenges of seeking public policy 
interventions based on our scientific theories and findings (e.g. Lanman; 
Waring). I agree with most of the comments that have been posted and as 
everybody points out we need more evidence before much more can be said. 
But there are two issues I’d like to pick up. The first is a very basic question 
about whether there really are two kinds of social glue (Kavanagh; 
Buhrmester) or just one with varying degrees of ‘stickiness’ (Ingram and 
Prochownik; Reeve and Johnson). The second is about whether social glue is 
really the most important issue in addressing my three wishes for the world or 
if other sources of altruistic behaviour should receive equal or greater priority 
(e.g. Swann; Smith). Altruism has many sources but in my view social glue 
plays an especially important role in solving collective actions problems that 
carry high individual costs. 
One or two kinds of social glue? 
As an anthropologist who studies religion, I am always an outsider looking in – 
albeit sympathetically. And that is often how I feel when trying to untangle the 
intricacies of the social identity perspective on group psychology, which 
appears (again, from the outside) to be forcibly reminiscent of a religious 
organization. Although the social identity perspective has two branches – 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) – all 
followers subscribe to a mainstream orthodoxy with varying degrees of piety 
and commitment. Core beliefs include that everything in group psychology, 
including the phenomenon of identity fusion discussed in my target article, 
falls within the ambit of the social identity perspective. As such, fusion appears 
to be just one more sect under the infinitely extendable umbrella of the mother 
church and her encompassing doctrines. Of course, outsider impressions can 
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be misleading and I cannot claim to have conducted long-term ethnographic 
research among social identity theorists. So my comments on this topic will be 
as tentative as they are curious and well intentioned – and no doubt shaped to 
a degree by my having been trained to recognize the trappings of religious 
fervour no matter how subtly it is expressed. 
 Field notebook in hand, I have spent the last few days tracking down 
informants. Let’s begin by giving some space to their voices (it’s standard 
practice in ethnographic research to disguise sources): “A while back, 
advocates of SIT and SCT (self-categorization theory) realized that many of 
their own workers didn’t believe in the main tenets of one or more cardinal 
doctrines, e.g. functional antagonism (that activation of personal self reduces 
salience of social self and vice-versa) and depersonalization (that groups 
members are categorically interchangeable when the group is salient).” 
Another informant described what happened next: “Instead of providing a 
formal revision to the theory, some researchers simply endorsed arguments 
that were in direct opposition to the original tenets. The result was that the 
informally revised ‘theory’ now embraced both the original theoretical 
ideas (e.g. functional antagonism and collective ties) and their opposites (e.g. 
identity synergy and relational ties). The resulting ‘social identity perspective’ 
was immune to falsification.” 
 Unfalsifiable? This sounds like a set of beliefs that can’t be resolved on 
empirical grounds. Like a religious system perhaps? Let’s explore this in more 
detail… 
 According to Ingram and Prochownik identity fusion is probably just an 
“extreme form of social identification.” Reeve and Johnson agreed with this 
take on things, arguing that the notion of identity fusion merely “expands the 
SIT paradigm.”  But as Kavanagh and Buhrmester carefully argued in a series 
of posts, the empirical evidence points to systematic differences between 
fusion and identification. Kavanagh cited a body of empirical evidence showing 
that existing measures of social identification simply cannot subsume identity 
fusion. If, for example, personal and social identities are hydraulically related, 
what is one to make of evidence that activating a personal identity enhances 
the tendency for fused individuals to enact pro-group behaviour? Building on 
this, Buhrmester pointed out that fusion theory focuses on the causal role of 
relational ties to other group members as well as collective ties to the group 
whereas the social identity perspective is only concerned with the latter. The 
two kinds of social glue predict different psychological and behavioural 
outcomes. 
 What motivates efforts to make identity fusion part of the social identity 
perspective rather than, as the evidence suggests, an alternative theory of how 
groups are glued together? The motivation doesn’t appear to stem from either 
empirical or logical considerations but from a desire to maintain the 
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sovereignty of a tradition. It is easy to underestimate the extent to which 
academics (including good scientists) can form distinctive cultural traditions 
that, just like any other traditions, can glue adherents to each other and to a set 
of values and beliefs. And this makes the study of social glue all the more 
complicated. 
 If we think of the social identity perspective as a kind of church it is a 
relatively new one. There is of course a much bigger and older church, called 
‘social science’. As Michael E. Smith reminded us, in an informative post 
entitled somewhat indignantly “You Folks Should Pay Attention To Social 
Science”, there is a grand tradition out there, one that has a more illustrious 
history than the social identity perspective and a greater plethora of special 
terms for things, ways of talking about them, and other special customs and 
beliefs. When I started to read Smith’s commentary, I thought at first he was 
going to say that we’d made a basic error that could have been avoided if only 
we’d known about some previous research on the topic. But as I read on it 
became clear that his main point was something quite different – that there is 
another academic tradition over the hills that has lots of doctrines about social 
glue, including what to call it and how to think about it. 
 To my mind, however, the most thought-provoking response of all, from a 
big-picture perspective, was the one written by Lanman. He reminded us that 
when we’re asking questions about human psychology we should ask about 
both mechanism and function. To put this in the language of the evolutionary 
sciences, we should address both proximate and ultimate causation. The social 
identity perspective has taught us much of importance about the proximate 
level but when we broaden the focus of groups research to consider issues of 
ultimate causation we begin to understand social glue rather differently. 
 To appreciate why fusion and identification may be different it could help 
to unpack their evolutionary histories. Lanman and I hypothesize that the 
categorical ties studied by social identity theorists evolved to bind together 
tribes and ethnic groups whereas identity fusion emerged to hold kin groups 
together: two functions, two psychological mechanisms, and two kinds of 
social glue. Kin psychology (on this view) regulates behavior among genetically 
related individuals, facilitating exceptionally high levels of altruism towards 
the group, rooted in the fusion of personal and social selves. Ethnic 
psychology, by contrast, solves collective action problems using categorical ties 
based on identification with groups. As Lanman succinctly put it: 
“Whitehouse’s account of identity fusion as ‘psychological kinship’… which lies 
at the heart of the imagistic mode of cohesion… utilizes the findings of both 
evolutionary psychology and socio-cultural anthropology and can serve as a 
reminder of the insights we can reach when we move past the more 
exclusionist rhetoric sometimes used by scholars in these fields.” 
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How important is social glue? 
Several contributors to this discussion pointed out that a range of factors 
contributes to altruistic behavior and that ‘social glue’ is only one of them. Bill 
Swann, for example, mentioned shared interests, top down incentives and 
deterrents, and ideologies that appeal to our capacities for empathy or right 
and wrong. Arguably, however, social glue has a special role in motivating 
altruism. You and I might share similar concerns about social problems, 
discover common vested interests, and even agree on the best courses of 
collective action, but I doubt whether any of this would motivate most of us to 
make big sacrifices for the greater good. 
 Not everyone shares my hunch. Some prominent activists insist, for 
example, that morality rather than social glue is the best way to address the 
major collective action problems faced by our species. One of my three wishes 
for the world was to eliminate extreme poverty. The moral philosopher Peter 
Singer famously gives away a third of his income to the charity OXFAM and he 
urges everyone else to do the same. I vividly remember a lecture given by 
Singer in Oxford, at which he pointed out the wrongness of allowing extreme 
poverty to persist in the world and the fact that we could eliminate the problem 
overnight if we all set our minds to it. 
 But that’s the problem. We won’t all do it. And since we know that other 
people won’t all do it, we typically decide not to do it ourselves. After the 
lecture, I sat next to Singer at lunch and I put it to him that the moral 
argument wasn’t going to change things. His response? It simply had to – 
there was no other way. But as Swann points out there are indeed other ways. 
 Aside from moralizing we’ve seen many efforts to solve world problems 
using a diversity of strategies. For example, over several decades concerted 
effort has been made via high level international initiatives to redistribute 
wealth from the world’s wealthiest countries to help the poorest and there has 
long been broad agreement that 0.7% of GNP is a realistic target for provision 
of aid. But apart from some outliers like Scandinavia, we have fallen woefully 
short in achieving these kinds of targets. Swann mentions various mechanisms 
of regulation in modern states that can be used to solve collective action 
problems without relying directly on social glue – we can incentivize, legislate, 
tax, subsidize, and do other things in a top-down fashion to tackle poverty. But 
I would argue that none of these approaches works very well without the right 
kinds and quantities of social glue. 
 Social glue plays a vital role in solving collective action problems in a 
sustainable fashion. Without it, other mechanisms deteriorate and fail. 
Examples are legion but to take just one from my own country: social glue was 
essential to setting up the welfare state in the UK but it is now eroding because 
of a culture of sponging and entitlement symptomatic of a progressive 
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weakening of national cohesion. Whereas the social sciences have traditionally 
provided quite sophisticated ways of understanding systems of regulation – in 
economics, law, governance, politics, and so on – a more basic aspect of 
coordination in society – social glue – has not been understood so well, and 
figures less prominently in the thinking of policy makers and advisors. I think 
it’s time to rectify the neglect. 
Closing remarks 
After much debate on points of detail, Gordon Ingram concluded an 
informative thread in this debate by taking issue with my suggestion that 
“when we fight back against injustice it’s because we believe that its victims 
share our suffering. The victims are, in an important sense, one with us.” 
Ingram retorted: “This, I think, is quite wrong: I predict that it is not necessary 
to feel fused with someone in order to feel a duty of care towards them… it 
comes down to the need for more empirical research: these are two testable 
predictions and I hope that someone will test them soon. Until then, Harvey is 
not really justified in making this sort of claim.” Ingram’s call for more data is 
well taken. And I should have been careful to emphasize repeatedly that my 
fusion-based explanation for altruism (including parochial altruism) is no 
more than a working hypothesis rather than an established fact. But by the 
same token Gordon is offering a counter-prediction rather than demonstrating 
the wrongness of mine. Although we do need more evidence, the idea that 
empathizing and moral reasoning are sufficient to motivate extreme sacrifice 
for the group warrants skepticism. By contrast, there is already quite 
compelling evidence that when compassion and morality are bolstered by a 
visceral belief that the group is me, self-sacrificial commitment markedly 
increases. 
